講座題目：Mergers and Merger Waves under Incomplete information
報(bào)告人：從佳佳
報(bào)告時(shí)間：2019年11月30日上午10：00-11：20
報(bào)告地點(diǎn)：經(jīng)管院B224
主辦單位：珞珈青年經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理論壇
經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)系
數(shù)理經(jīng)濟(jì)與數(shù)理金融系
內(nèi)容摘要：This paper studies how incomplete information affects firms' merger incentives and the likelihood of merger waves. We find mergers become strategic complements under incomplete information even if they are strategic substitutes under complete information. Total merger frequency and the likelihood of merger waves are very likely to increase under incomplete information. Compared with the scenario that no firm has private information, leading firms usually would like to pay to be informed. Following firms would always stay ignorant intentionally even if they can know demand information without any cost. Incomplete information tends to increase the joint profits of leaders and followers, but it hurts consumer surplus. Reducing information incompleteness in an industry enhances consumer surplus.
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：從佳佳，2011年畢業(yè)于武漢大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)基地班，2018年獲得香港大學(xué)產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)與戰(zhàn)略方向博士學(xué)位。研究興趣集中于產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論和應(yīng)用微觀經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，具體包括企業(yè)并購(gòu)和沉默持股、大數(shù)據(jù)對(duì)企業(yè)策略的影響等。研究成果發(fā)表于Management Science、Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization等刊物。
