講座題目：Link complementarity and social coordination（聯(lián)系互補(bǔ)性和社會(huì)協(xié)調(diào)）
主講人：崔志偉 中國(guó)人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院
講座地點(diǎn)：經(jīng)管院210
講座時(shí)間：2023年11月27日10:00
講座內(nèi)容摘要：
We consider a model of social coordination and network formation where agents decide on an action in a coordination game and on whom to form costly links to. We explore the role of link complementarity; that is, active and passive connections are strategic complements, where for a given agent, active connections are links formed by herself, and passive connections are links that other agents form to her. With link complementarity, agents have to deal with both the issue of link coordination and the issue of action coordination. When agents are constrained in the number of links they form, Nash equilibria, including both action-homogenous and action-heterogenous strategy profiles, are characterized by reciprocal sub-networks where an agent forms links with agents who form a link with her. Depending on the precise parameters of the model, risk-dominant or payoff-dominant strategy profiles are stochastically stable. More interestingly, the resulting networks are strongly reciprocal: for almost every agent, the set of agents to whom she forms a link coincides with the set of agents who form a link with her. The notion of strong reciprocity substantially refines the set of reciprocal networks, and offers a prediction for interaction structures.
我們考慮了一個(gè)社會(huì)協(xié)調(diào)和網(wǎng)絡(luò)形成的模型，在這個(gè)模型中，代理人在協(xié)調(diào)博弈中決定行動(dòng)，并決定與誰(shuí)建立代價(jià)高昂的聯(lián)系。我們探討了聯(lián)系互補(bǔ)性的作用，也就是說(shuō)，主動(dòng)聯(lián)系和被動(dòng)聯(lián)系是一種戰(zhàn)略互補(bǔ)，對(duì)于某個(gè)代理人來(lái)說(shuō)，主動(dòng)聯(lián)系是由她自己形成的聯(lián)系，而被動(dòng)聯(lián)系則是其他代理人與她形成的聯(lián)系。在聯(lián)系互補(bǔ)的情況下，代理人既要處理聯(lián)系協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題，又要處理行動(dòng)協(xié)調(diào)問(wèn)題。當(dāng)代理人在建立聯(lián)系的數(shù)量上受到限制時(shí)，納什均衡，包括行動(dòng)同質(zhì)和行動(dòng)異質(zhì)策略組合，其特征是相互的子網(wǎng)絡(luò)，其中代理人和與她建立聯(lián)系的代理人形成聯(lián)系。根據(jù)模型的精確參數(shù)，風(fēng)險(xiǎn)主導(dǎo)型或報(bào)酬主導(dǎo)型策略組合是隨機(jī)穩(wěn)定的。更有趣的是，由此產(chǎn)生的網(wǎng)絡(luò)是強(qiáng)相互的：對(duì)幾乎每個(gè)代理人來(lái)說(shuō)，她建立聯(lián)系的代理人集合和與她建立聯(lián)系的代理人集合是重合的。強(qiáng)相互的概念大大完善了相互網(wǎng)絡(luò)的集合，并為互動(dòng)結(jié)構(gòu)提供了預(yù)測(cè)。
主講人學(xué)術(shù)簡(jiǎn)介：
崔志偉，中國(guó)人民大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院副教授。主要研究領(lǐng)域及興趣為網(wǎng)絡(luò)博弈理論及應(yīng)用、博弈學(xué)習(xí)理論及應(yīng)用等。主持多項(xiàng)國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目，研究成果發(fā)表于Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control、Journal of Mathematical Economics等國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)權(quán)威期刊，以及《管理評(píng)論》、《運(yùn)籌與管理》等管理類CSSCI權(quán)威期刊。
