講座題目：Information Design for Social Learning with Patient Agents（面向有耐心群體社會學(xué)習(xí)的信息設(shè)計）
主講人：呂辰 北京大學(xué)匯豐商學(xué)院
講座時間：2025年10月27日10:00
講座地點(diǎn)：學(xué)院210
講座內(nèi)容摘要：
Sequentially coming agents may adopt a new technology. Early adoption can generate information about its value, which is either high or low, and an intermediary decides how such information will be dynamically published. Because individuals tend to wait and free-ride on information generated by others, efficient social learning is hard to achieve. Facing this challenge, we study how the intermediary can improve social welfare by designing its information publishing policy. To incentivize early adoption, we show it is optimal to restrain future information flow via inducing individually sub-optimal adoption but not excessive waiting. The optimal design features a simple threshold stopping structure: in every period, recommend adoption if the intermediary’ s current belief is more optimistic than a threshold; otherwise, recommend waiting forever. While the first-best design uses a constant threshold, the optimal design features time-varying thresholds that typically cross the first-best one. We also examine special cases where learning is via conclusive news. In the good news environment, the optimal design needs to involve a middle phase in which exploration is randomly terminated; in the bad news environment, adoption may be continued even if bad news has arrived. These serve to mitigate the individuals’ incentive problem efficiently.
序貫決策的個體可能選擇采納某項(xiàng)新技術(shù)。早期采納行為能夠產(chǎn)生關(guān)于技術(shù)價值（高或低）的信息，而信息中介可以動態(tài)控制這些信息的發(fā)布。由于個體傾向于等待并搭便車?yán)盟水a(chǎn)生的信息，實(shí)現(xiàn)有效社會學(xué)習(xí)面臨挑戰(zhàn)。針對這一問題，我們研究信息中介如何通過設(shè)計信息發(fā)布策略來提升社會福利。為激勵早期采納，最優(yōu)策略會通過引導(dǎo)個體實(shí)施次優(yōu)采納，而非過度等待，來限制未來信息流。最優(yōu)設(shè)計具有簡單的閾值停止結(jié)構(gòu)：在每個決策期，若中介當(dāng)前信念高于閾值則推薦采納；否則建議永久等待。雖然首優(yōu)設(shè)計采用恒定閾值，但最優(yōu)設(shè)計采用隨時間變化的閾值，且通常會跨越首優(yōu)閾值。我們還考察了通過決定性消息進(jìn)行學(xué)習(xí)的特殊情形：在好消息環(huán)境中，最優(yōu)設(shè)計需要包含隨機(jī)終止探索的中間階段；在壞消息環(huán)境中，即使出現(xiàn)壞消息仍可能建議繼續(xù)采納。這些機(jī)制能有效緩解個體激勵問題。
主講人學(xué)術(shù)簡介：
呂辰，北京大學(xué)匯豐商學(xué)院助理教授。主要從事信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)相關(guān)的應(yīng)用微觀理論研究，重點(diǎn)關(guān)注信息設(shè)計及其在產(chǎn)業(yè)組織、平臺設(shè)計等方面的應(yīng)用。研究成果發(fā)表于Journal of Economic Theory。
