講座題目：Weaponization of Trade Credit in Competitive Market: Evidence from the Paycheck Protection Program（競(jìng)爭(zhēng)市場(chǎng)中貿(mào)易信貸的武器化：來(lái)自薪資保障計(jì)劃的證據(jù)）
主 講 人：李雄 中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)
講座時(shí)間：2025年12月18日15:00
講座地點(diǎn)：學(xué)院237（金融系易方達(dá)會(huì)議室）
講座內(nèi)容摘要：
This paper examines whether firms adopted aggressive trade credit policies to expand market share during the COVID-19 pandemic. Exploiting the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) as a plausibly exogenous liquidity shock, we implement a difference-in-differences design comparing PPP recipients and non-recipients from 2019 to 2021. We find that PPP recipients increased trade-credit provision by 1.4–2.1 percentage points relative to control firms, with no pre-trend. The expansion is concentrated among firms operating in highly competitive markets, with low pandemic exposure, and toward marginal customers with smaller size and weaker bargaining power. Consistent with aggressive liquidity redeployment, PPP recipients subsequently gained market share but at cost of short-term loss. The market-share gains stem from reduced supply-chain relationship disruptions and the acquisition of new customers. We further document significant spillover effects: rivals lost market share, while downstream customers modestly benefited. Overall, the findings suggest that public liquidity support not only stabilized firms but also reshaped product-market competition, as firms used aggressive trade-credit policies to reallocate demand and transmit liquidity along supply chains.
本文考察企業(yè)在特殊時(shí)期是否通過(guò)采取更激進(jìn)的貿(mào)易信貸政策來(lái)擴(kuò)張市場(chǎng)份額。利用薪資保障計(jì)劃所帶來(lái)的外生性流動(dòng)性沖擊，我們采用2019–2021年間PPP獲得者與非獲得者的雙重差分設(shè)計(jì)進(jìn)行識(shí)別。結(jié)果顯示，相較于對(duì)照組企業(yè)，PPP獲得者貿(mào)易信貸投放比例顯著提高了1.4–2.1個(gè)百分點(diǎn)，且不存在顯著的事前趨勢(shì)。該效應(yīng)主要集中在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)更激烈、疫情暴露程度較低的行業(yè)，以及面向規(guī)模較小、議價(jià)能力較弱的邊際客戶。與激進(jìn)的流動(dòng)性再配置一致，PPP 獲得者隨后獲得了更高的市場(chǎng)份額，但付出了短期利潤(rùn)下降的代價(jià)。市場(chǎng)份額的提升主要源于供應(yīng)鏈關(guān)系中斷的減少以及新增客戶的獲取。此外，我們進(jìn)一步記錄到顯著的溢出效應(yīng)：競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手市場(chǎng)份額受損，而下游客戶則獲得一定程度的好處。總體而言，本文發(fā)現(xiàn)公共流動(dòng)性扶持不僅穩(wěn)定了企業(yè)運(yùn)營(yíng)，也通過(guò)企業(yè)對(duì)貿(mào)易信貸政策的激進(jìn)運(yùn)用重新塑造了產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)格局，推動(dòng)了需求再分配并沿供應(yīng)鏈傳導(dǎo)流動(dòng)性。
主講人學(xué)術(shù)簡(jiǎn)介：
李雄，中國(guó)科學(xué)技術(shù)大學(xué)管理學(xué)院和科技商學(xué)院特任副教授，碩士研究生導(dǎo)師。博士畢業(yè)于香港大學(xué)，曾在美國(guó)華盛頓圣路易斯大學(xué)做訪問(wèn)學(xué)者。主要研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)楣?yīng)鏈金融。目前多篇工作論文在金融和會(huì)計(jì)的領(lǐng)域頂刊返修，包括The Accounting Review和Management Science (獨(dú)立作者)。
