講座題目：Regulating Misinformation in Influencer Markets網(wǎng)紅推薦中的虛假信息與機(jī)制規(guī)范
主講人：關(guān)旭 華中科技大學(xué)管理學(xué)院 教授
講座時(shí)間：2026年01月08日10:30
講座地點(diǎn)：學(xué)院419
講座摘要：
Influencers play a crucial role in shaping consumers' purchase decisions by evaluating and recommending products in exchange for sales commissions. However, misinformation about products, whether due to intentional deception or a lack of expertise to accurately evaluate products, can mislead consumers into purchasing low-value products. This paper investigates how regulations can mitigate misinformation through two mechanisms: penalizing influencers for misrecommendations and improving their expertise. We find that while higher penalties increase the cost burden on influencers and reduce their incentive to recommend a firm’s products, they can also increase consumers' perceived value of the recommended product and ultimately benefit not only consumers but also the influencer and the firm. Surprisingly, although improving influencer expertise enhances the accuracy of product evaluations, it may also incentivize influencers to make deceptive recommendations more frequently, leaving the firm worse off when collaborating with more experienced influencers. From the consumers' perspective, neither increasing the penalty for misrecommendation nor raising influencers' expertise level alone necessarily safeguards them from misinformation and may even backfire. Our findings highlight the need for policymakers to adopt a joint regulatory approach that considers penalties and expertise requirements to curb misinformation in influencer marketing.
網(wǎng)紅通過(guò)評(píng)估并推薦產(chǎn)品以換取銷售傭金，在影響消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買決策方面發(fā)揮著關(guān)鍵作用。然而，無(wú)論是由于故意欺騙，還是因?yàn)槿狈?zhǔn)確評(píng)估產(chǎn)品的能力，關(guān)于產(chǎn)品的錯(cuò)誤信息都可能導(dǎo)致消費(fèi)者購(gòu)買低價(jià)值產(chǎn)品。本文研究了兩種監(jiān)管機(jī)制如何減少錯(cuò)誤信息：一是懲罰網(wǎng)紅的錯(cuò)誤推薦，二是提升其專業(yè)能力。研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，提高懲罰力度雖然會(huì)增加網(wǎng)紅的成本負(fù)擔(dān)、降低其推薦企業(yè)產(chǎn)品的意愿，但也能提升消費(fèi)者對(duì)推薦產(chǎn)品的感知價(jià)值，最終不僅使消費(fèi)者受益，也有利于網(wǎng)紅和企業(yè)。令人意外的是，盡管提升網(wǎng)紅專業(yè)能力能提高產(chǎn)品評(píng)估的準(zhǔn)確性，但也可能激勵(lì)網(wǎng)紅更頻繁地進(jìn)行欺騙性推薦。當(dāng)企業(yè)與經(jīng)驗(yàn)更豐富的網(wǎng)紅合作時(shí)，其自身利益反而可能受損。從消費(fèi)者角度看，單純提高錯(cuò)誤推薦懲罰或增強(qiáng)網(wǎng)紅專業(yè)能力，并不一定能保護(hù)他們免受錯(cuò)誤信息的影響，甚至可能產(chǎn)生反效果。研究結(jié)果提示應(yīng)采取結(jié)合懲罰措施與專業(yè)能力要求的聯(lián)合監(jiān)管策略，以遏制網(wǎng)紅營(yíng)銷中的錯(cuò)誤信息傳播。
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：
關(guān)旭，華中科技大學(xué)管理學(xué)院教授，華中卓越學(xué)者首席教授，國(guó)家高層次人才。主要研究方向?yàn)楣?yīng)鏈管理、運(yùn)營(yíng)與市場(chǎng)結(jié)合、信息設(shè)計(jì)和平臺(tái)經(jīng)濟(jì)。在Management Science, Marketing Science, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, Information Systems Research, Production and Operations Management等商學(xué)院權(quán)威期刊發(fā)表多篇論文。現(xiàn)任中國(guó)運(yùn)籌學(xué)會(huì)博弈論分會(huì)副理事長(zhǎng)，中國(guó)管理現(xiàn)代化研究會(huì)生產(chǎn)與運(yùn)作管理專業(yè)委員會(huì)副主任委員，中國(guó)管理科學(xué)與工程學(xué)會(huì)青年工作委員會(huì)秘書長(zhǎng)；擔(dān)任Decision Sciences、Service Science期刊副主編。
