講座題目：On the Optimal Design of Biased Contests
報(bào)告人：吳澤南
報(bào)告時(shí)間：2019年11月29日上午9：00-10：00
報(bào)告地點(diǎn)：經(jīng)管院B224
主辦單位：珞珈青年經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理論壇
經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)系
數(shù)理經(jīng)濟(jì)與數(shù)理金融系
內(nèi)容摘要：This paper explores the optimal design of biased contests. A designer imposes an identity-dependent treatment on contestants, which varies the balance of the playing field. A generalized lottery contest typically yields no closed-form equilibrium solutions, which nullifies the usual implicit programming approach to optimal contest design and limits analysis to restricted settings. We propose an alternative approach that allows us to circumvent this difficulty and characterize the optimum in a general setting under a wide array of objective functions without solving for the equilibrium explicitly. Our technique applies to broad contexts, and the analysis it enables generates novel insights into incentive provision in contests and their optimal design. For instance, we demonstrate that the conventional wisdom of leveling the playing field, which is obtained in limited settings in previous studies, does not generally hold.
主講人簡介：吳澤南，男，博士，北京大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院助理教授。于2015年獲賓夕法尼亞大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士學(xué)位，同年任教于北京大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)系。研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)閼?yīng)用微觀理論，產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論以及保險(xiǎn)市場(chǎng)。研究成果在RAND Journal of Economics，Journal of Economics & Management Strategy，Geneva Risk and Insurance Review，Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and Finance，Economics Letters等期刊上發(fā)表。
