講座題目：The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality
報(bào)告人：孟大文
報(bào)告時(shí)間：2019年11月29日下午2：00-3：00
報(bào)告地點(diǎn)：經(jīng)管院B224
主辦單位：珞珈青年經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理論壇
經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)系
數(shù)理經(jīng)濟(jì)與數(shù)理金融系
內(nèi)容摘要：This paper compares the long-term and short-term contracts in terms of their competitive and welfare effects in a dynamic nonlinear pricing model with network externalities and bounded rationality. Contrary to the existing literature and traditional treatments adopted by competition authorities, we find that a long-term contract is at least as competition-friendly and socially efficient as a sequence of short-term contracts. If the consumers have constant types and pessimistic expectation regarding the network size, then for a certain range of parameters, a long-term contract facilitates entry of more efficient competitors, and is socially more efficient than the short-term contracts. If the consumers’ types are independent across time, a long-term contract leads to the same competitive outcome as, but gives a higher social surplus than, its short-term counterpart.
主講人簡(jiǎn)介：孟大文，上海財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)講席副教授，特任研究員，研究領(lǐng)域包括博弈論、合約理論、產(chǎn)業(yè)組織理論等。曾于《games and economic behavior》,《Review of Economic Design》，《Operations Research Letters》，《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)季刊》，《中國(guó)工業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)》等國(guó)內(nèi)外刊物發(fā)表論文多篇。
