講座題目：Data-Driven Hold-Up and Relational Contracts Joint work（數(shù)據(jù)驅(qū)動(dòng)的掣肘問(wèn)題與關(guān)系契約）
主講人：陸卓然 上海交通大學(xué)安泰經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院
講座時(shí)間：2025年12月10日14:00
講座地點(diǎn)：學(xué)院210
講座主題摘要：
This paper studies how relational contracts mitigate hold-up problems between platforms and online sellers when platforms use their data advantage to compete against sellers. In each period, the seller decides whether to sell on the platform and how much to invest in product innovation, which depreciates without continued investment from the seller. The platform then chooses whether to copy the seller’s product. If it does, the two parties compete; otherwise, they share the monopoly profit. We show that with rapid depreciation, the optimal relational contract is stationary and efficient when the discount factor is sufficiently high. By contrast, with slow depreciation, the platform always copies the seller under high discount factors, whereas cooperation can be sustained at intermediate levels. The efficiency of relational contracts depends critically on the seller’s outside option and the depreciation rate. The outside option has discontinuous and nonmonotonic effects on efficiency, implying that a higher outside option does not necessarily benefit sellers. Moreover, the depreciation rate can have opposing effects on efficiency, depending on whether the platform copies the seller when the relational contract is breached.
本文研究當(dāng)平臺(tái)利用其數(shù)據(jù)優(yōu)勢(shì)與線上賣家展開競(jìng)爭(zhēng)時(shí)，關(guān)系契約如何緩解平臺(tái)與賣家之間的掣肘問(wèn)題（hold-up problems）。在每一期中，賣家決定是否在平臺(tái)上銷售，以及在產(chǎn)品創(chuàng)新上的投入水平；若賣家不持續(xù)投入，創(chuàng)新將發(fā)生折舊。隨后，平臺(tái)選擇是否復(fù)制賣家的產(chǎn)品。如果平臺(tái)復(fù)制，雙方進(jìn)入競(jìng)爭(zhēng)；否則，他們共享壟斷利潤(rùn)。我們證明，在折舊速度較快的情形下，當(dāng)貼現(xiàn)因子足夠高時(shí)，最優(yōu)的關(guān)系契約是穩(wěn)定且有效率的。相比之下，在折舊速度較慢的情況下，當(dāng)貼現(xiàn)因子較高時(shí)，平臺(tái)總是會(huì)復(fù)制賣家，而合作僅能在中等水平的貼現(xiàn)因子下被維持。關(guān)系契約的效率關(guān)鍵取決于賣家的外部選擇和折舊率。外部選擇對(duì)效率具有不連續(xù)且非單調(diào)的影響，這意味著更高的外部選擇并不必然使賣家受益。此外，折舊率對(duì)效率可能產(chǎn)生相反方向的影響，這取決于在關(guān)系契約被違約時(shí)平臺(tái)是否會(huì)復(fù)制賣家。
主講人學(xué)術(shù)簡(jiǎn)介：
陸卓然，上海交通大學(xué)安泰經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理學(xué)院助理教授。本科畢業(yè)于清華大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)專業(yè)，后于美國(guó)加州大學(xué)洛杉磯分校獲得經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士學(xué)位。研究領(lǐng)域?qū)儆谖⒂^經(jīng)濟(jì)理論，涵蓋契約理論、信息經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、組織經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、網(wǎng)絡(luò)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)等方向。目前的研究重點(diǎn)包括信號(hào)產(chǎn)品的最優(yōu)定價(jià)、基于網(wǎng)絡(luò)結(jié)構(gòu)的團(tuán)隊(duì)監(jiān)督設(shè)計(jì)、具有網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)的智能互聯(lián)產(chǎn)品的商業(yè)策略，以及數(shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)中的關(guān)系型契約。研究成果發(fā)表于 Journal of Economic Theory、MIS Quarterly 等期刊。
